The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

FROM CONTAINMENT TO ... SYZYGY?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HERBERT M. CARR United States Army

# **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited.

**USAWC CLASS OF 1995** 





U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

## USAWC STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROJECT

## FROM CONTAINMENT TO ... SYZYGY?

by

# Lieutenant Colonel Herbert M. Carr United States Army

Dr. Robert J. Bresler Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DITC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19950619 034

### **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR:

Herbert M. Carr (LTC) USA

TITLE:

From Containment to ... Syzygy?

FORMAT:

Individual Study Project

DATE:

18 April 1995

PAGES: 32

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The U.S. is at an historic crossroads following the end of the Cold War. The old twin themes of containment and deterrence must now give way to a newer vision of the U.S. role as we approach the 21st century. This paper follows a visioning process requiring development of alternatives based on signposts, values and frameworks. Signposts are current domestic and global environments revealing a U.S. in economic trouble with budget and trade deficits, a falling dollar and multiplying peace operations at a time when Europe and Japan are becoming economic superpowers. Although U.S. values must be protected, economic competition requires increased emphasis on realpolitik. A balanced framework of internationalism and reduced multilateralism will suit the current environment and U.S. purposes. Recognizing that the U.S. must retain leadership to protect national interests, the vision unfolds as an alignment of major powers — a syzygy of purpose— with Europe, Japan, and the U.S. in a concert of power, sharing economic, political and military burdens to ensure world stability. Thus, the new U.S. role could be primus inter pares of a "Pax Consortis" with common interests and goals, allowing the U.S. time to restore its economic vitality.

Accession For	-1824
NTIS GRAMI DTIC TAR	
By Distribution/	an our makes being a common
Aveilability Onder Aveil and for Spoutal	
AH	Contract Con

## From Containment To ... Syzygy?

### Introduction

The United States is at an historic crossroads where significant political. economic, and military policy and strategy changes are inevitable but the direction we must take and the destination seems anything but clear. The end of the Cold War, the third major world change in this century following the First and the Second World Wars, is the major reason for the indecision. Such a large change in the global security environment has predictably resulted in a weakened political consensus toward foreign policy that, during the Cold War, guided American national security strategy. This strategy, calling for containment and deterrence of the former Soviet Union, now no longer applies. As a result, there is a growing political debate, a debate 'raging in three dimensions, all reflecting disagreements with deep roots in our history. The eventual outcome - the new consensus - will form the foundation of our future national security and military strategy." The dimensions of the debate. according to Steven Metz, are the extent of American involvement (isolationism versus globalism), the basic philosophy of our approach to the world and how we define national interests (realism versus idealism), and the form of our engagement in the world (unilateralism versus multilateralism).2

There is a raging domestic political debate. The recent tidal wave during the 1994 Congressional elections has profoundly changed the political landscape in Washington. The "Contract with America" of the Republican Party contains initiatives which may, if brought to fruition, bring about a real change of course toward different goals.

One of these changes is a proposed constitutional amendment requiring a

balanced national budget. The genesis for this amendment is the stubborn annual budget deficit. We are awaking with alarm, after a period of global economic hegemony, to the realities of a dangerous and growing national debt. While our erstwhile enemies - turned allies have established themselves as economic superpowers, the relative economic strength of the U.S. has waned.

In response to the twin imperatives of the end of the Cold War and budget deficits, it was preordained that the size of our military forces would be reduced. The big question was how large the reduction could be and still retain a capability for two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The resulting bottom-up review called for a reduction of forces to a size not seen since the beginning of WW II.

For a nation used to 40 years of a status quo established and maintained during the Cold War, military, economic, and political changes on this scale seem to happen more quickly than we can follow - causing a kind of paralysis - with repercussions and aftershocks hitting almost before we fully realize that there has been a tremendous earthquake in the fabric of our global and domestic environment. It is difficult to analyze the full meaning of such gigantic events while in the midst of continuing developments; more difficult still to chart a strategic course through the fog - but that is what is required. Although "(o)ur age is a hinge of history, and the post-Cold War order is a work in progress,"3 we have now had some time to look at this new world and at trends that should be telling us about new realities. "What is clear is that as the Cold War fades away, we face not a 'new world order' but a troubled and fractured planet, whose problems deserve the serious attention of politicians and publics alike."4 Much has been made of the absence of a post-Cold War threat. Yet, one has only to survey developing instability in what used to be called the Third World, the former Soviet Union, and the growing economic and military power in the far east to realize that there is more threat out there than we are prepared to deal with

simultaneously.

We must ask ourselves, as a nation: has the fundamental role of the U.S. changed in the post-Cold War world? If we are no longer the leader of the free world against communism, what are we? In order to answer the question, we need to postulate a strategic vision — a basic requirement for leadership since the beginning of the Christian era.

### Vision Process

Proverbs XXIX, 18: "Where there is no vision, the people perish." Vision gives a reference point on the horizon towards which we can move. Without that guiding reference we will be tempted to react to every issue or happenstance that arises with different guidelines. To develop a vision, we need to follow a process with structure that will lead to a marriage with the traditional National Policy and Strategy Model of the U.S. Army War College. When completed we should have a "... true vision [which] must provide a clear image of a desirable future — one that represents an achievable, challenging, and worthwhile long range target toward which people can direct their energies." According to Burt Nanus, generation of a vision begins with images which must be sorted into three piles: possible futures, probable futures, and preferable futures. These images of the future are developed using "three primary sources: signposts, values, and frameworks." Both signposts and values yield pertinent national interests. The framework is the paradigm used to select and evaluate the alternative vision images. The effects of global and domestic environments will determine how values and signposts are interpreted.

# Signposts - National Interests and Values/Ideology

In a foggy world of uncertainties there are few solid references for the strategist better than those given by the concepts of national and public interests. National interests can be simply defined as what's good for the nation in international affairs; by contrast, public interests are those interests good for the nation in domestic affairs. 10 We must remain focused and alert to facts and trends—the signposts—which help us identify the basic constraints governing the environment and affecting our most important national interests.

"Morgenthau supposed he had an objective standard by which to judge foreign policies: were they pursuing the national interest defined in terms of power? That is, was the statesman making decisions that would *preserve and improve the state's power*, or was he squandering power in such a way that would ultimately weaken the state? The statesman asks, will this step improve or weaken my power?" 11

Hence, national interests are a measure related to the calculation of national power when contemplating policy and vision. The idea of national interests, though old, is not obsolete, being useful today in calculations of all the elements of national power.

"The resurgence of national interests as the common ground on which to organize citizens, societies, and institutions in the global information economy forces theory to consider the interaction between the economy, technology, culture, and politics as the framework for understanding the new, emerging world. Instead of thinking global and acting local, as is often proposed by political activists, the political leaders of the 1990s will have to think local, relating to their own people, while acting global to reach out to the flows of power and wealth that form the structure of the international system. What has not changed in the global economy of the information age is that politics, not economics, is the stuff of which our dreams and our nightmares are made." 12

Thus, there is a definite relationship between domestic and global policies. A vision for U.S. national strategy will balance foreign and domestic requirements, and

embrace the public interest. 13

National interests can be categorized into vital interests which concern the survival of the state, and secondary interests which represent no threat to sovereignty and can be compromised. Further, interests can be temporary or permanent, specific or general, complementary or conflicting. 14 But, "(t)rue national interest thinking is rather tightly limited to your nation." 15 An idealistic interventionist expands U.S. interests into world interests creating risks of "fighting for peace in many spots around the globe." 16 "A 'crusade' may thus be defined as the use of one's power in causes little related to national interest." 17 Therefore, we must guard against creating pseudonational interests from idealism. Remaining objective and clear eyed, our national interests can be identified by questioning whether contemplated actions or policies will preserve or increase the power of the state and "(i)t matters little whether the national values of the state are Christianity, ..." democracy, or whatever. 18 Thus, the identification, sustainment, and advancement of national interests must be the ingredient of any vision for the state.

However, the signposts of national interests can be blurred and made unclear.

This comes from the domestic and global environment, and it must impact the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

### Domestic Environment

Winston Churchill wrote that "(n)o foreign policy can have validity if there is no adequate force behind it and no national readiness to make the necessary sacrifices to produce that force." And so it is today that we must be concerned about our domestic economic health and moral strength. These are required to generate our military strength and support our foreign policies. No foreign policy agenda can long

endure without the support of the electorate. But, there are other aspects or factors of the domestic environment having a distorting effect on policies. Among these are: elite political convictions (political paradigms which form the bases for interaction with the external world), mass media, policy inertia, the new "contract with America", the national economy, and the traditional U.S. values, ideology and ethos.

Of these factors, the one with the greatest current impact is the U.S. economic situation and its effect on the balance of national security strategy. The economic picture is not pretty, consisting of an annual budget deficit and a national debt, a growing trade deficit, and a declining U.S. dollar.

The annual United States budget deficit has been fluctuating in the vicinity of \$200 billion a year with a resulting cumulative national debt now at approximately \$4.5 trillion. <sup>20</sup> Payments on the interest due on the national debt are anticipated to be \$213 billion in FY95 (on a predicted deficit of \$176B) growing to \$255 Billion in FY99. <sup>21</sup> "The state of the national economy and deep public concerns over deficit spending are driving federal policy through the budget. "<sup>22</sup> The annual payments on the debt are larger and growing faster than the annual deficits.

Historically, approximately 20% of the dollars used to pay the U.S. debt came from overseas investors. The continued deficits, however, may be eroding the attractiveness of the investment for three reasons: first, investment in places like Asia are becoming more attractive; second, the dollar has plunged in value against the Yen and the Mark; and third the U.S. has become the world's largest borrower.<sup>23</sup> "The Japanese, who now control three-fifths of the world's surplus capital, aren't at all pleased to see the bonds they bought when the yen stood at 240 to the dollar being redeemed at less than 100 to the dollar."<sup>24</sup> More recent dollar devaluations on the world market may be due, among other effects, to the failure of the Balanced Budget

Amendment and the U.S. loan guarantees intended to stabilize the Mexican Peso. The continuing weakness of the U.S. dollar is tantamount to a weakening of the economic power of the U.S. — a power which must be sustained in order to generate military and political power and ultimately to guarantee national security.

"...(T)he United States is the world's foremost military power, with commitments all over the globe; its wealth, while considerable, is unevenly distributed, resulting in immense social problems at home; it has a large current-accounts deficit and needs to borrow from foreigners. Given those circumstances, a prolonged period of slow growth compounds its existing problems, making it unlikely that the United States can continue to fund the same level of military security and attend to its social needs and repay its debts. A country where real weekly incomes have fallen steadily since 1973 — as in this case — is ever less inclined to fund even the worthiest needs."25

This last is a major point in the discussion on the economy — that is that given current U.S. economic trends, we can no longer freely distribute funds for economic foreign aid or military aid without thoughts of priority — and of national interests.

Another troubling domestic economic trend is the worsening trade deficit.

Despite an aggressive campaign for trade agreements, America's trade deficit is "on track toward a record exceeding \$150 billion for 1994."26 Although U.S. exports are up, imports are increasing even faster. The devaluation of the dollar has partially reduced the impact of the trade deficit by favoring U.S. exporters over importers, but the continuing net export of wealth is another indicator of the erosion of U.S. world economic leadership. "The most dramatic indicator of a troubled U.S. adjustment to the new dynamics of international competition is America's gargantuan trade deficit."27 The result of the deficits is an "unprecedented decent from the world's largest creditor (up through the early 1980's) to the world's largest debtor by 1987."28

#### Is the U.S. in Decline?

Some, such as Paul Kennedy, have suggested that because of these vexing economic conditions and because of "imperial overstretch" due to excessive military expenditures, that the U.S. is in decline as a world power. "The United States now runs the risk, so familiar to historians of the rise and fall of previous Great Powers, of what might roughly be called 'imperial overstretch': that is to say, decision makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously."29 But there are other writers who contest the assertion of a U.S. decline due to excessive military spending or even at all. Murray Weidenbaum writes in The Washington Quarterly that: "The facts are quite clear: the United States has devoted a declining share of its national resources to defense spending over the past half century." And, "...the pace of military outlays certainly does not provide a basis for proclaiming the decline of the republic."30 Patrick Cronin writes that: "...we should not be beguiled by 'declinists' who argue that America is in the throes of inevitable decline and incapable of a leading role, or by those who believe that we are at 'the end of history'..."31 And, Alvin Toffler add his opinion in Power Shift: "Much tooth-gnashing and wailing has taken place over America's relative economic decline — actually a measure of the success of its post-World War II strategy for putting Japan and Europe back on their feet. The fact is that, despite misconceptions, the United States still represents about the same share of Gross World Production that it did fifteen years ago."32 Hence the decline debate may be just a pedantic argument over labels — except for the pressing economic problems.

In identifying fixes to the problems he discusses above, Kennedy "... suggests that the fundamental strategic objective of the United States as it moves toward the

twenty-first century ought to be to enhance its per capita productivity for the sake of long-term growth."33 Kennedy is not alone in his call for a need to increase productivity and competitiveness. Daniel F. Burton states that: "(w)ith the end of the Cold War, competitiveness has emerged as a new national priority, much as containment was during the past half century."34 Hence, one sure thing the U.S. should identify as a national interest is improving U.S. competitiveness and productivity as well as the general economic climate.

It seems clear, therefore, that the U.S. is not in an irrevocable "decline" but rather going through a period of adjustment. And, the need to re-focus has been acknowledged by the Clinton administration. In both the 1994 and 1995 National Security Strategy (NSS), the President identifies "America's economic revitalization" as the second of the three central goals.<sup>35</sup> The other two central goals of the NSS are: "To sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight." and, "To Promote democracy abroad".<sup>36</sup>

US public opinion; recent elections; and the military.

"As the United States debates how to set post-Cold War national security priorities, public opinion will be an increasingly important factor in assessing the political sustainability — or lack thereof — of alternative strategies."37 The information age has been bringing more and more varied national and international information "live" into the household or just about anywhere for some 20 years now. The electorate has experienced the birth of this new age or has grown up with it and is, consequentially, much more discerning now. Technology will soon allow instant feedback from everyone who owns a personal computer. For the time being, those who need to know public opinion trends can tap into them through multiple poling

agencies which make it their business to keep track of trends. Currently, "(t)he American public wants the United States to remain engaged in international affairs, yet also wants to see U.S. priorities shift to the domestic arena with greater attention paid to American economic security."38 "The building pressures for domestic change in the United States, the emergence of a powerful anti-status quo sentiment in the American electorate, and a growing frustration with 'politics as usual' inevitably spill over — if only indirectly — into some hard questions concerning American foreign policy priorities..." as well as domestic priorities.39

Such built-up pressures were released in an historic way during the November 1994 Congressional Elections. The landslide election and the Republican agenda known as the "Contract with America" have taken Washington by storm and changed both the House and the Senate to a more conservative oriented stance with a noticeable anti-"big government" attitude. Of the ten-point agenda which the Republicans promised would be passed in the first 100 days of the 104th Congress, the most pertinent to this discussion are two—the Fiscal Responsibility Act, and the National Security Restoration Act..

The Fiscal Responsibility Act includes a balanced budget/tax limitation amendment and a legislative line-item veto amendment. The balanced budget amendment has passed the House but failed to pass the Senate. Ultimately, however, to regain our fiscal balance, this amendment or legislative package must return fiscal responsibility to our Congress. Clearly, efforts to balance the budget when they come, will involve additional budget cuts from where we are today. Early budget reduction estimates made by the House Budget Committee in November, 1994 would have balanced the FY95 budget through additional cuts of: 6% from Defense; 32% from International Affairs; 22% from Science, Space and Technology; 65% from Energy,

and more reductions in other categories.<sup>40</sup> It seems obvious that reductions of this magnitude, in whatever their final distribution, cannot help but have a negative impact on the U.S. largess with the world and the willingness to use military forces without a clear national interest.

Such cuts in defense would come at a time when "America's armed forces are woefully underfunded given all they're being asked to do. In July (1994) the General Accounting Office put a number on the problem: \$150 billion."41 Since that time supplemental funds have been raised to offset, but not eliminate the funding problem. The proposed National Security Restoration Act promises to strengthen national defense funding to maintain world credibility. It restricts the placement of U.S. troops being placed under U.N. command and reduces the U.S. budget commitments to the U.N. from 25% to 20% of peacekeeping operations. It also would require the president to "certify that they were in the vital national interests of the United States."42 The President has acknowledged the need to maintain a strong military posture as the number one central goal of his NSS (mentioned earlier) is: "To sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight."

### Global Environment

There are at least four important world trends relevant to strategy: the decline of communism; the emergence of new centers of economic power; lingering instability in the developing world; and growing interdependence among the industrial democracies. 43 The first and forth trends are easy to understand: communism has obviously failed, our strategy of containment having succeeded, and we can turn our attention to other pressing issues; the growing interdependence of industrial nations is a natural development of the information age and not a threat. The most important two

trends, therefore, are relative economic power and world instability.

The relative economic strength of one nation to another can drive the political and military relationships of those nations, if not directly, then certainly indirectly. And today, the European Community (EC) and Japan have become economic giants comparable to the United States in their economic power.

"Taken together with the difficulties of the American economy, especially its enormous trade and budgetary deficits and the fading power of the dollar, this has led to a reshaping of the global economy. Although still the world's most powerful state, the U.S. is now primus inter pares. American economic hegemony has been replaced by a tripartite relationship between the USA, Japan and the EC."44

While this new economic status of the Europe and Japan does little for the American ego, it's not necessarily bad. A product of the Marshall Plan, the economic growth of our former enemies helped ensure a solid western base of democracy and capitalism which formed an important part of our strategy of containment. And today, these nations are our political, economic, and military friends. They are an asset — a legacy of the Cold War — which we should take care to maintain, but perhaps in a different manner. "With the demise of the Soviet Union, the last reason for a military-political basis to the postwar world economic system falls by the wayside." Hence, we should reorganize trade policies to focus on commercial ends and maintain or improve our relative economic power while maintaining our strong relationships with Europe and Japan.

These economic superpowers are strong political, if not always strong military allies. It can be argued that such military allies will be needed. "The world of 1994 is very different from the world of 5 or 6 years ago. It is far less predictable and more violent than anyone anticipated when President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev took steps to end the cold war." 46 "Throughout the world, ethnic and religious nationalism are replacing ideology as social forces most likely to

promote violence and regional instability. These forces will increase pressures on collective security institutions ..."47 Thus it will be imperative for the U.S. to cultivate and strengthen our traditional western allies while developing new regional allies we can rely on when it becomes necessary to form coalitions. The reason for these coalitions is to protect U.S. national interests impacted by regional instability. This "cultivation" may be accomplished by increasing cooperation and combined exercises with military services of allies as well as political pressure to increase the military responsibility of these allies in order to reduce the U.S. requirement.

The relative success and promise of regional coalitions, however, cannot be extended to include the more general case of collective security. Recent experiences with the United Nations and peacekeeping missions, such as Somalia and Bosnia, suggest that more caution is required when deciding to support such operations. The UN has bogged down in almost 20 operations in the field covering the gamut from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement; pressures in Washington and other Western capitols has mounted to avoid new operations. 48 "Images of failing peacekeeping operations have registered adversely on the administration and even more on the congress, with the result that the United States is precipitously backing away from peace keeping commitments both with regard to money and personnel."49 The result was published as the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 4 May 1994. "PDD-25 spells out strict guidelines now to be considered before the United States agrees to participate in any operation ... " and (n)ew operations will rarely, if ever, satisfy these conditions."50 Additional, subsequent political concern over peacekeeping operations was reflected in the Republican Contract with America as we have seen earlier.

The combined effect of the global and domestic environments leaves the U.S. in a debate over its role on a world stage whose props are in disarray and whose plot and dialog are still being developed. To be sure, however, the U.S. must face serious economic factors both domestically and globally which will constrain and perhaps dominate the formulation of policy and strategy for at least the next decade, or until the twin deficits and currency devaluation is brought under control. The result will be a more cautious and thrifty U.S., unwilling to venture afar without a clear national interest supported by popular opinion. Although less powerful militarily than during the Cold War, the U.S. nonetheless will remain the most powerful military force on earth. And although powerful, we will not be powerful enough to make every world concern our own, or to try to be a world policeman without assistance. Therein lies the need to enlist reliable political, economic, and military powers willing and able to shoulder their responsibilities alongside the U.S. in the interests of world stability. The calculations of the numbers and locations required to establish a balance of power favorable to the U.S. are made based on traditional realpolitik.

# Values and Ideology versus Realism and Balance

There is a psychological factor or historical American moral factor and ethos of advancing freedom, equality, and human rights that argues, however, that America cannot rely on realpolitik alone as sufficient justification for major policies and particularly those policies which involve sacrifice or ventures beyond our borders. Satisfaction of national interests is paramount to the survival and growth of the U.S., but we do not and have not pursued our national interests without a certain moral intent underlying our policies and goals. This dual nature exhibited by America has been referred to as "the paradox of the American character." The United States is most effective when, as in the Gulf War, our actions combine a clear moral component

with rigorous promotion of geostrategic interests."52 There are examples, such as Vietnam, where the U.S. lost either the pragmatic need to protect real U.S. interests, a moral or ideological need, or both where lack of purpose was evident and perhaps the ultimate cause of failure.

On the other hand, there is a danger of overemphasizing moral or ideological views at the expense of pragmatism. Such overemphasis can result in contradictory policies at odds with logical purpose. A simple example is the unqualified support of Israel at the expense of Arabs when the real interest of the U.S. in the Middle East is Arabian oil at reasonable prices. A second example is the democratization policy of the U.S. as espoused in the NSS.

Democratic peace theory holds that democracies do not fight each other.

Hence, if nations are transformed into democracies world peace will result. But,

Christopher Layne writes in International Security that he has found no evidence to support that assertion:

"Modern-day proponents of a liberal theory of international politics have constructed an appealing vision of perpetual peace within a zone of democracy and prosperity. But this 'zone of peace' is a peace of illusions. There is no evidence that democracy at the unit level negates the structural effects of anarchy at the level of the international political system. Similarly there is no evidence that supports the sister theory: that economic interdependence leads to peace."53

This democratization policy is further suspect because as one would quickly surmise:

"Democracy requires suitable social and economic preconditions: a fairly equal distribution of land, wealth, and income; high levels of literacy and economic development; cultural norms conducive to democracy, including traditions of tolerance, free speech, and due process of law; and few deep ethnic divisions. Most of the Third World lacks democracy because these preconditions are missing. Moreover, it would require vast social engineering, involving long and costly post intervention American occupation to introduce them. American taxpayers clearly would not support extravagant projects

### of this sort."54

There seems little to suggest that the policy of enlargement of democracy could be applied successfully except to a few special cases. Taken literally, the current policy would undermine any non-democratic government including successful autocracies central to vital U.S. interests such as Saudi Arabia. Additionally, states which are already democracies such as Iran don't always fit the mold we had in mind. Although democratic, Iran's religious leaders have veto power over any government action they disapprove, and the government has a policy of actively exporting its brand of Islamic fundamentalism. Is the current democratic Iran better than the autocratic government of the Shah during the Cold War?

"To promote democracy abroad", the third central goal of the NSS, may be similar in some respects to Iran's policy of exporting Islamic fundamentalism. Michael Roskin argues that ideology closely resembles religion; it is a plan to improve society. "The opposite of ideology is pragmatism." [155] "Ideology and national interests are at odds; a country caught up in ideology is typically unable to pursue a calm, uncluttered view of reality." [56]

Hence, there must be a balance struck between the realism necessary to frame, understand, promote, and defend national interests and the ideology and morality giving the depth of meaning necessary to anchor the pursuit of those interests in sufficient determination. A full dose of realism is necessary but should be colored and flavored with a pinch of morality and ideology.

#### Framework - form and extent

"Values and information, though necessary for the formation of images of the future, are insufficient in and of themselves.<sup>57</sup> There must be a framework with which

to examine the alternative images of a desirable future. 58 For this purpose, the paradigms of realism versus ideology, globalism versus isolationism, and multilateralism versus unilateralism will be useful as a framework representing the extremes of the three axes of current political debate as described by Metz. Earlier discussion about balance in Metz's dimension of basic philosophy addressed the balance of realism versus ideology. We'll now look at form and extent.

### Form

A balance must also be found in the form that our foreign policy takes.

Unilateralism (doing it yourself) must be balanced with multilateralism (international cooperative effort). Budget deficits and a downsized U.S. military has led to thinking that world influence could be maintained only through increased reliance on the U.N. But, collective security has proved not to be the answer to world stability with a small budget. To the contrary, UN peacekeeping problems, notably in Somalia and Bosnia have soured domestic support for US participation in such operations, particularly those which do not directly contribute to the protection of vital U.S. national interests.

"The U.S. has been unilateralist in regions such as the Caribbean and Central America and multilateralist in regions such as Europe where allies are necessary... President Clinton and top advisors initially placed great stress on strengthening the United Nations ... and talked of 'assertive multilateralism' as a way to maintain influence during defense cuts. By the end of 1993, however, the enthusiasm of the Clinton Administration, Congress, and the American public for expanded U.N. peacekeeping had waned: ...rather than stretching scarce defense resources and sharing the burdens of global security, U.N. peace operations could draw us into conflicts we might otherwise have avoided."59

And so, the extreme multilateralist position of the administration has been moved toward a more balanced semi-unilateralist position signaled by the advent of PDD-25. Further possible movement along the "form" axis represented by the "Contract with

America" places us now in a paradox of sorts: our desire to avoid reliance on multilateralism is moving us toward unilateralism at a time when our economic capacity to accomplish one-sided foreign policy is greatly reduced. A possible way out of the paradox is a retreat to isolationism.

#### Extent

The extent of American involvement with the world - from isolationism to globalism - is a key axis of current debate. 60 But the debate here need not be lengthy. There is an audible argument now for "selective disengagement abroad" to save resources and put domestic affairs in order. 61 Such an argument is consistent with the position derived above that the realist vision gets the lion's share of the balance along Metz's basic philosophy axis. Here, however, the balance of isolationism with globalism necessarily must be much more evenly balanced because a policy of isolationism is clearly impossible in today's world. "Most Americans recognize that they should not turn their back on the world - a feeling that has held through the last thirty years, interrupted seriously only as the Vietnam War came to an end in the mid-1970's. On balance, they are convinced that their own best interests lie in being able to influence decisions beyond their borders."62 International relationships are now tightly linked economically and politically whether we like it or not. And, the information age will accelerate these interrelationships. Therefore, the extent of our involvement or engagement seems easy to define - we remain heavily involved or engaged with world events in order to affect our economic and political agendas with world players and we retain the capability to protect our vital interests anywhere it becomes necessary.

## Alternative Futures

Protecting our national interests requires the judicious use of all three elements of national power while remaining heavily engaged in world affairs. This, in turn, requires that the U.S. maintain its world leadership status. The alternative future is to abdicate that leadership and accept the leadership of others. But, the U.S. will not allow itself to be lead—the destination might not be to our liking; and both public and elite opinion in the U.S. and abroad robustly supports U.S. leadership. This will, of necessity, be a leadership with limited means until our deficit problems are solved. If they are not solved it is possible that the U.S. could become incapable of leading the world—this is the alternative future that no one wants.

Given that our vision requires the U.S. to maintain its leadership, the question remains — how will we lead and toward what ends? Taking clues from the environment discussed earlier: we need to focus on a future where our domestic economy has regained strength, where our twin deficits have been supplanted with surpluses and the U.S. dollar is again clearly the currency standard of choice; we need a stable world in which free international trade is allowed and encouraged to flourish without barriers biased against the U.S.; we need a secure and stable world, safe from regional hegemony or aspiring superpowers with interests different from U.S. national interests. Focusing on realpolitik requires us to diminish our tendency toward ideological zeal as a bad investment but not necessarily abandon the ideals that have accounted for our greatness. <sup>64</sup>

"In the next century, American leaders will have to articulate a concept of the national interest and explain how that interest is served by the maintenance of the balance of power. America will need partners to preserve equilibrium in several regions, and these partners cannot always be chosen on the basis of moral considerations alone."65

Because we cannot police the world alone, our leadership must involve partnership with reliable allies capable of maintaining stable regions. For America's part, we could best further our ideals through the most tried and true of all leadership principles — by setting the example. "As advocated by many 19th century American statesmen, we should serve as a model, offer advice when asked, but resist the interventionist urge." 66

There are, then, three principle futures which present themselves as alternatives: the unthinkable future of an American has-been reduced in power and in decline; an America focused inward that has abdicated its leadership role; and an America serving as a model, primus inter pares, in the lead with her economic house in order. The latter future is the only real choice. To achieve that future, however, will require some changes from current paradigms.

## Processes and Structure Changes.

We are in some ways still acting as the global superpower with an unlimited budget and a Cold War size military — our good intentions have exceeded our means both domestically and globally. Therefore, among the changes the U.S. needs to make, the first, and most important is to correct dangerous economic trends before they get out of hand. Second, the Cold War paradigms of intervention, and massive foreign aid must be curbed and used sparingly when true vital interests are at stake. And third, the U.S. must leverage the investment made in our "economic equals" we created since World War II by demanding their participation in burden sharing.

The need for burden sharing is founded in the U.S. requirement to refocus on economic competition and away from containment policies, many of which penalize competitiveness. Such policies, however, are only part of the problem. "Politics as usual," which have allowed the budget deficit to grow, have failed to make the hard

calls on entitlement programs. The defense budget has already been reduced too far for current levels of military peacekeeping operations. While America gets her economic house in order, new efficiencies must be found; and excessive and expensive ideological intervention when no vital national interests are at stake must be avoided.

The second necessary change follows from the end of the Cold War. There is no longer a need to intervene in every threatened third world country - most have no geostrategic value for the U.S. and so cannot pass the so-what test. Peace operations can, as was seen in Somalia, degenerate into combat. The deployment of military forces, therefore, should never be taken lightly. And, the current NSS acknowledges the need for such caution: "On those occasions when we consider contributing U.S. forces to a UN peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that would guide any decision to employ U.S. forces."67 That decision process should question whether the effort is worth the lives of one or more U.S. soldiers and whether intervention in the sovereignty of a another state is truly a matter of vital national interests. There are some who believe any intervention usurps a state's "right to self determination, and the freedoms ... so easily gained will too easily disappear once the intervening power departs."68 We must be more realistic and patient with our ideological goal of democratization, recognizing that "(t)he historical record shows that past U.S. interventions have generally failed to bolster democracy."69 Deployment decisions should therefore be made on the basis of restrictive tests of which the six Weinberger criteria are an example. Perhaps a more timeless, and elegant set of criteria would be the Just War Criteria of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello.

In the third needed change, the U.S. must now leverage the investment made in

Europe and Japan since World War II. "The new tripolar balance of economic power will need to be matched by a reapportionment of burden sharing and decision making responsibilities among the leading industrial democracies."70 Throughout the Cold War the U.S. pulled the entire free world – now it is time to enlarge the yoke, and enlist the economic, political, and military power of Europe and Japan to help retain world stability. The idea of a new concert of power, advocated by both Jablonsky and Cronin, is attractive as a way to achieve that enlistment. As we have seen earlier, the circumstances of the domestic and global environments appear to favor a foreign policy based on the three-axis Metzian model balanced with realism (without neglecting our ideals), moderate internationalism, and rejection of extreme multilateralism. Jablonsky: "A vision that incorporates a great power concert will allow the United States to address its domestic problems and thus keep American values intact, while continuing to provide leadership in global politics."71 Cronin: the "... U.S. never really enjoyed an absolute Pax Americana ...", but remains primus inter pares; "Collective efforts among Europe, Japan, and the United States provide a judicious path for protecting their common security goals with reasonable means..."72 Cronin concludes that the new emerging paradigm that should be adopted is that of internationalism in concert with other key industrial democracies - he names this new paradigm: Pax Consortis.73

The strength of a trilateral concert of powers would be inherent in the natural alignment of key national interests. The principal shared national interests would mutual security and free trade. The greater the juxtaposition and conjunction of interests, the greater the combined power generated by the concert. The glue holding the great powers together would be a proportional sharing of burden and benefit — a syzygy of purpose reinforced by mutual support. The concert, going beyond current

agreements and treaties, would require Europe and Japan to contribute by accepting a more active role, ensuring regional stability by deterring aspiring regional hegemons. The U.S. would continue to its leadership and add depth to regional stability as the guarantor of security. World stability, a key U.S. national interest, would be maintained through regional stability from the bottom up.

With the European and Pacific regions secure, the U.S. could afford more unilateral action in such vital areas as the Middle East and parts of the Americas.

Regions without geostrategic importance or not affecting other vital national interests could be left to the UN.

## **Vision**

A vision can now be postulated, using the "Pax Consortis" paradigm in which the fundamental role of the U.S. changes in the post-Cold War world. We no longer need be the leader of the free world, prosecuting containment of communism, but we ought to be: 1) primus inter pares and leader of a trilateral concert of free and industrial powers consisting of the U.S., Japan, and Europe; 2) our international goals, together with our partners of the concert, or trilateral accord should be to: ensure our mutual security, increase free enterprise, and promote regional stability; and 3) our primary domestic goal must be to rebuild the power of our domestic economy and improve the standard of living of our citizens. Furthermore, we should lead by example, not by force, avoiding: 1) intervention in the affairs of sovereign states, especially when motivated by ideology; and 2) deployment of military forces not supported by vital U.S. national interests.

In our new determination to achieve efficiencies born of more realism and less ideological passion, in order to provide the wherewithal to rejuvenate our economy, we must not forget the traditional ideals of our nation; '...any future strategy which does

not make the United States a force for good will be unsustainable."74 These are the ideals which are invoked whenever a president seeks to motivate the nation and justify sacrifice, for a vision is good only to the extent that it captures the imagination and support of the citizens. To ultimately achieve a vision requires consensus, but also decisive authority.75

### Conclusion

Our nation is at a crossroads where strategic vision is required to point out the correct pathway leading us into the next century, away from the Cold War, and toward a better future. This vision must balance the many domestic and international requirements we find so challenging in those environments today and it must be supported by a solid consensus and executed by decisive authority.

We have seen that this vision may well involve a three-sided concert of powers arrangement — a kind of syzygy — between the US, Europe, and Japan with political, economic and military agreements designed to achieve our common goals. And, that these goals could include our mutual security, increasing free enterprise, and to promote regional stability. The U.S. must remain the leader and should lead by example. Domestically, we should concentrate on rebuilding the power of our economy. We should avoid intervention in the affairs of sovereign states or deployment of military forces for any reason not supported by vital U.S. national interests. And, we must not forget the traditional ideals of our country which made us great.

### **ENDNOTES**

<sup>1</sup>Steven Metz, <u>America In The Third World: Strategic Alternatives And Military Implications</u>. (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994), 2.

2|bid, 2-10,

<sup>3</sup>Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The Premature Burial Of Global Law and Order: Looking Beyond the Three Cases From Hell." in <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Summer 1994), p. 160.

<sup>4</sup>Paul Kennedy, <u>Preparing For The Twenty First Century</u>. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 349.

<sup>5</sup>Robert D. Heinl, ed. <u>Dictionary Of Military and Naval Quotations</u>. (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1985), 200.

<sup>6</sup>Burt Nanus, "Futures-Creative Leadership," <u>The Futurist</u>, (May-June 1990): 17.

7lbid, 14.

8lbid, 17.

<sup>9</sup>lbid, 16.

<sup>10</sup>Michael G. Roskin, <u>National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy</u>. (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994): 1.

11 lbid, 4.

<sup>12</sup>Martin Carnoy, "Multinationals In A Changing World Economy: Whither The Nation State?" In <u>The New Global Economy in the Information Age</u>, ed. Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen S. Cohen, and Fernando H. Cardoso. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 164.

<sup>13</sup>David Jablonsky, Why Is Strategy Difficult? (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992), 64.

14Roskin, 6.

15lbid, 10. 16lbid. 17lbid 18lbid 19Heinl, 203. <sup>20</sup>Andrew Glass, "Will foreigners cash out with debt-ridden U.S.?," The Harrisburg Patriot-News, 27 December 1994, p. A7. <sup>21</sup>Association of the United States Army, <u>Army Budget Fiscal Year 1995</u>; An Analysis. (Arlington: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 1994), 1. 22lbid 23lbid 24lbid. <sup>25</sup>Kennedv. 294. <sup>26</sup> Martin Crutsinger, "U.S. trade deficit surges higher," The Harrisburg Patriot, 20 January 1995, p. B5. <sup>27</sup>Stephen S. Cohen, "Geo-Economics: Lessons From America's Mistakes," In The New Global Economy in the Information Age. ed. Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen S. Cohen, and Fernando H. Cardoso (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 114. 28lbid. <sup>29</sup>Paul Kennedy, <u>The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers</u>. (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 515. 30 Murray Weidenbaum, "Economics and the National Security," The

Washington Quarterly 11 (Autumn 1988): 45.

31 Patrick M. Cronin, "America's Role in the New World Order," In <u>From Globalism To Regionalism: New Perspectives on US Foreign and Defense Policies</u>, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993), 208.

32Alvin Toffler. Power Shift. (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 441.

<sup>33</sup>Kennedy, <u>Preparing For The Twenty First Century</u>, 294.

<sup>34</sup>Daniel F. Burton Jr., "Competitiveness: Here To Stay." <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Autumn 1994): 99.

<sup>35</sup>The White House, <u>A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement</u>, (Washington D.C., The U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. i.

36lbid

<sup>37</sup>Ronald D. Asmus, <u>The New U.S. Strategic Debate</u>. (Santa Monica: Rand Arroyo Center, 1994), 79.

38lbid, 95.

39lbid, 83.

<sup>40</sup>David E. Rosenbaum, "Balanced budget works in theory," <u>The Harrisburg Patriot-News</u>, 28 November 1994, p. A3.

<sup>41</sup>Lawrence Di Rita, "Contract to revive national defense," <u>Washington Times</u>, 15 November 1994, p. 17.

42Ibid.

43Cronin, 204.

44Allen M. Williams, <u>The European Community</u>, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 233.

45Carnoy, 10.

46 Steven K. Metz and Earl H. Tilford, Jr. World View: The 1994 Strategic

<u>Assessment From the Strategic Studies Institute</u>, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994): 2.

47lbid, 1.

<sup>48</sup>Thomas G. Weiss, "The United Nations And Civil Wars," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Autumn 1994), 139.

<sup>49</sup>Donald J. Puchala, "Outsiders, Insiders, and UN Reform," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Autumn 1994): 170.

50Weiss, 153,

51 Asmus, 17.

<sup>52</sup>Metz, <u>America In The Third World:</u> <u>Strategic Alternatives And Military Implications</u>, 8.

53Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19 (Fall 1994): 48.

<sup>54</sup>Steven Van Evera, "The United States and the Third World: When To Intervene?" In <u>Eagle In A New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era</u>. ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 117 and 118.

55Roskin, 12.

56lbid, 13.

57Nanus, 16.

58lbid.

59Metz,10-11.

60lbid, 3.

61Cronin, 199.

62<sub>Asmus, 81.</sub>

63Cronin, 221.

<sup>64</sup>Henry Kissinger, "How To Achieve The New World Order," <u>Time</u>, 12 March 1994, 77.

65lbid,74.

66Metz, 28.

67The White House, 16.

<sup>68</sup>Jeffrey Whitman, <u>An End To Sovereignty?</u> Paper presented at the "Joint Service Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE)," at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Jan 1995, 15.

69 Van Evera, 118.

70Cronin, 205.

71David Jablonsky, <u>Paradigm Lost? Transitions And The Search For A New World Order</u>. (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 85.

72Cronin, 217.

73lbid, 208, 209.

74Metz, 24.

75 Jablonsky, Why is Strategy Difficult?, 81.

### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Asmus, Ronald D. <u>The New U.S. Strategic Debate</u>. Santa Monica: Rand Arroyo Center, 1994.

Association of the United States Army. <u>Army Budget Fiscal Year 1995: An Analysis</u>. Arlington: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 1994.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P. "The Premature Burial Of Global Law and Order: Looking Beyond the Three Cases From Hell." <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Summer 1994): 145 - 161.

Burton, Daniel F., Jr. "Competitiveness: Here To Stay." <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Autumn 1994): 99-109.

Carnoy, Martin "Multinationals In A Changing World Economy: Whither The Nation State?" In The New Global Economy in the Information Age, ed. Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen S. Cohen, and Fernando H. Cardoso, 45-96. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.

Carothers, Thomas "Democracy and Human Rights: Policy Allies or Rivals?" The Washington Quarterly 17 (Summer 1994): 109 - 120.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Cohen, Stephen S. "Geo-Economics: Lessons From America's Mistakes," In <u>The New Global Economy in the Information Age</u>. ed. Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen S. Cohen, and Fernando H. Cardoso, 97-147. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993.

Cronin, Patrick M. "America's Role in the New World Order," In <u>From Globalism To Regionalism: New Perspectives on US Foreign and Defense Policies</u>, ed. Patrick M. Cronin, 199 - 237. Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1993.

Di Rita, Lawrence, "Contract to revive national defense," <u>Washington Times</u>, 15 November 1994, p. 17.

Evera, Steven Van. "The United States and the Third World: When To Intervene?" In Eagle In A New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era. ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, 105 - 150. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu - The Art Of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Hebir, J. Bryan. "The United States And Human Rights: Policy For The 1990s In Light Of The Past," In <u>Eagle In A New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era</u>. ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, 233 - 255. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

Heinl, Robert Debs Jr. ed. <u>Dictionary Of Military and Naval Quotations</u>. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1985.

Jablonsky, David. <u>Paradigm Lost? Transitions And The Search For A New World Order</u>. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993.

. Why Is Strategy Difficult? Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1992.

Kenen, Peter B. <u>The International Economy</u>. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Kennedy, Paul. <u>Preparing For The Twenty First Century</u>. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

. The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books, 1987.

Kissinger, Henry. "How To Achieve The New World Order," <u>Time</u> (March 14,1994): 73 - 77.

Layne, Christopher. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," <u>International Security</u> 19 (Fall 1994): 5 - 49.

Metz, Steven. <u>America In The Third World: Strategic Alternatives And Military Implications</u>. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994.

Metz, Steven and Earl H. Tilford, Jr. <u>World View: The 1994 Strategic Assessment</u>
<u>From the Strategic Studies Institute</u>, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, 1994.

Nanus, Burt. "Futures-Creative Leadership," The Futurist, May-June 1990: 13 - 17.

Paarlberg, Robert L. "Ecodiplomacy: U.S. Environmental Policy Goes Abroad," In <u>Eagle In A New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era.</u> ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, 207-231. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

Puchala, Donald J. "Outsiders, Insiders, and UN Reform," The Washington Quarterly

17 (Autumn 1994): 161 - 173.

Rosenbaum, David E. "Balanced budget works in theory," <u>The Harrisburg Patriot-News</u>, 28 November 1994, p. A3.

Roskin, Michael G. <u>National Interest: From Abstraction To Strategy</u>. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994.

Rothchild, Donald and John Ravenhill. "Retreat From Globalism: U.S. Policy Toward Africa In The 1990s," In <u>Eagle In A New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era</u>. ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, 389 - 415. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

Ruggie, John Gerard. "Peacekeeping And U.S. Interests," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Autumn 1994): 175 - 184.

Stofft, William A. and Gary L. Guertner. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils Of Military Intervention," <u>Parameters</u> 15 (Spring 1995): 30 - 42.

The White House, <u>A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement</u>, Washington D.C., The U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

Toffler, Alvin. Power Shift. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.

Weidenbaum, Murray. "Economics and the National Security," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 11 (Autumn 1988): 39 - 46.

Weigel, George. "From Last Resort to Endgame: Morality, The Gulf War, and the Peace Process," In <u>But Was It Just? Reflections On the Morality Of The Persian Gulf War</u>. ed. David E. DeCosse, 19-41. New York: Doubleday, 1992.

Weiss, Thomas G. "The United Nations And Civil Wars," <u>The Washington Quarterly</u> 17 (Autumn 1994): 139 - 159.

Whitman, Jeffrey. An End To Sovereignty? Paper presented at the "Joint Service Conference on Professional Ethics (JSCOPE)," at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Jan 1995.

Williams, Allen M. The European Community, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Zakheim, Dov S. and Jeffrey M. Ranney. "Matching Defense Strategies To Resources: Challenges For The Clinton Administration," <u>International Security</u> 18 (Summer 1993): 51 - 78.